The Confederate Soldier's Pocket Manual of Devotions: Including, Balm for - Google Livres
The Upper Room magazine's mission is to provide a practical way to listen to scripture, connect with believers around the world, and spend time with God each . Brings the Lightning (The Ames Archives Book 1) - Kindle edition by Peter Grant. When the Civil War ends, where can a former Confederate soldier go to . Publisher: Castalia House (May 20, ); Publication Date: May 20, ; Sold by: . Devotion. Honor. Respect. Courage. Manliness. Walt Ames displays each of. Results 49 - 60 of 90 C. T. Quintard's Soldier's Pocket Manual of Devotions was one Civil War chaplain's expression of the hope and faith on which the credo is.
But you say you have seceded, so you cannot consistently claim them. I shall hold these negroes as contraband of war, since they are engaged in the construction of your battery and are claimed as your property. The question is simply whether they shall be used for or against the Government of the United States. Yet, though I greatly need the labor which has providentially come to my hands, if Colonel Mallory will come into the fort and take the oath of allegiance to the United States, he shall have his negroes, and I will endeavor to hire them from him.
On the way back, the correctness of my law was discussed by Major Haggerty, who was, for a young man, a very good lawyer. He said that he doubted somewhat upon the law, and asked me if I knew of that proposition having been laid down in any treatise on international law. Not the precise proposition, said I; but the precise principle is familiar law.
Property of whatever nature, used or capable of being used for warlike purposes, and especially when being so used, may be captured and held either on sea or on shore as property contraband of war.
Whether there may be a property in human beings is a question upon which some of us might doubt, but the rebels cannot Contraband of War. Butler at Fortress Monroe. At headquarters and in the fort nothing was discussed but the negro question, and especially this phase of it. I wrote the lieutenant-general that I awaited instructions but should pursue this course until I had received them. His instructions gave me no directions to pursue any different course of action from that which I had reported to him, except that I was to keep an accurate account of the value of their work.
But the local effect of the position taken was of the slightest account compared with its effect upon the country at large. The question of the disposal of the slaves was one that perplexed very many of the most ardent lovers of the country and loyal prosecutors of the war. It afforded a groundwork for discussion which yielded many excuses for those who did not desire the war to be carried on.
In a word, the slave question was a stumbling-block. Everybody saw that if the work of returning fugitive slaves to their masters in rebellion was imposed upon the Union troops, it would never be done; the men would simply be disgusted and finally decline the duty.
What ought to be done? Nobody made answer to that question. What will you do? To hold that contraband, as well might be done, by no means included all the coal in the country. It was a poor phrase enough; Wendell Phillips said a bad one. My staff officer, Major Winthrop, insisted it was an epigram which freed the slaves. The truth is, as a lawyer I was never very proud of it, but as an executive officer I was very much comforted with it as a means of doing my duty. The effect upon the public mind, however, was most wonderful.
Everybody seemed to feel a relief on this great slavery question. Everybody thought a way had been found through it. Plan of Fortress Monroe. There has been, so far as I know, in the several histories, but one very belittling account of the origin of this method of disposing of captured slaves used in war, and that one is the emanation of malice and ignorance in Abraham Lincoln, a history, a book which was written by one man with two pens. General Butler has had the credit of first pronouncing the opinion formulating the doctrine, that under the course of international law the negro slaves, whose enforced labor in battery building was at the time of superior military value to the rebels, are manifestly contraband of war, and as such confiscable by military right and usage.
There is no word or hint of this theory in his letter which reports the Mallory incident, nor any other official emanation of it by him until two months afterwards, when he stated casually that he had adopted such a theory.
Nevertheless it is very possible that the idea may have come from him, though not at first in any authentic or official form. It first occurs incidentally in a newspaper letter from Fortress Monroe of the same date of the Mallory incident: Again, the negro must now be reported as contraband, since every able-bodied negro not absolutely required on the plantation is impressed by the enemy into military service as a laborer on the various fortifications.
This double-named historian has stepped out of his way to attempt to rob me of the authorship of this theory of disposing of such captured slaves. If he had read my letters to General Scott he would have seen that I was asking from him instructions how to deal with the whole question of negro slavery during the war.
As I have already said, I have never claimed and never believed that contraband alone would cover that. That was the popular belief, not mine. I was asking Scott for instructions as to what I should do with the slave men, women, and children, sick and well, who came to me. I did not need any instructions from Scott or Cameron, neither of whom were lawyers, as to the legal question of the law of nations concerning captured slaves when used by their masters in actual warfare.
The question put and argued in those letters was: What was I to do with the slave population of the whole country who came to me voluntarily, men, women, and children. That question included the slaves of loyal men. In this matter I wanted the sanction of the government.
I had adopted a theory on this question for myself in Maryland, and got rapped over the knuckles for it by Governor Andrew. I had learned what manner of man Scott was, and I was desirous to take instructions from him for my action but not for my law.
Hay had stopped at the point where he was led to doubt my authorship of contraband because I had not mentioned it to Scott, and was so misled, no more would need to be said. The sin of ignorance God winks at, and I should follow that example. But having been a newspaper man himself, and this being a great question of international law, which has never yet been settled, and which, as he argues, contributed largely to the freeing of the slaves, he goes on to suggest that probably it was written by a newspaper reporter, because he finds the whole theory stated in a newspaper letter written at night after my return to the fort.
The whole matter of the interview with the flag of truce officer was the common talk of all, and the reporter was writing the current news. Hay suggests it might have come from an imaginative staff officer.
Why a staff officer? Hay, this was a matter of the laws of war. Hay had desired to write History and not simply to make a book suggesting historical riddles, he could easily have ascertained regarding the matter by writing a simple note either to Major Carey, who is an honored citizen of Richmond, Va. If he had put the question to me I should have answered: A poor thing, sir, but mine own.
The term was employed by you at a conference held between us, on the Hampton side of Mill Creek Bridge, on the evening of May 24,the day after Virginia had voted on the ordinance of secession, but before the ratification though anticipated was definitely known.
I was then in command, at Hampton, of four volunteer companies of about two hundred men one of them artillery without gunsvery poorly equipped, and almost entirely without ammunition, who had never been in camp, and who dispersed to their homes in the town and neighborhood every night; and you were in command of the United States troops said to be about ten thousand at Fortress Monroe. As there were no Virginia troops at that time between Hampton and Richmond a distance of ninety-six milessave three companies of infantry at Yorktown, and two companies, perhaps, organizing at Williamsburg, and as it was thus evidently important for us to preserve the peace, I had instructions from General Lee, then commander-in-chief of the Virginia troops, to avoid giving any provocation for the commencement of hostilities; to retire before your advance, if attempted; and to obstruct, as far as possible, your progress by burning bridges and felling trees across the public roads, until reinforcements could be sent to Yorktown.
At night, after the election May 23Col. Mallory, of the One Hundred and Fifteenth Virginia Militia with other citizenscalled at my headquarters, and asked me to take some steps for the recovery of one of his slaves, who had escaped to Old Point, and had been held there by you, and put to work in the service of the government.
I promised to do what I could, and accordingly sent to you, next morning, a communication under flag of truce the first I believe of the wardeeming that course advisable in view of the critical condition of affairs, and asked for a conference with you, which was promptly granted, 3. We met at the time and place appointed, and for several hours riding up Mill Creek to its head, and back again, via Buck Roe, by a slight detour to Fort Field Gate, we discussed many questions of great interest to me at leastamong them the return of fugitive slaves who had gone within your lines.
I maintained the right of the master to reclaim them, as Virginia so far as we knew was a State of the Union; but you positively refused to surrender them or any other property which might come into your possessionclaiming that they were contraband of war; and that all such property would be turned over to your quartermaster, who would report to the government, to be dealt with as might be subsequently determined. Failing in the accomplishment of my mission, we parted when it was quite dark, and returned to our respective posts.
I have frequently mentioned these facts, with many other incidents of the conference some serious and some amusing to members of my family and friends; and as it was the first time I had ever heard the term contraband so used, I have always given you whatever credit might attach to its origin. Respectfully, your obedient servant, M. Hay had looked in the New York Tribune, of which he was once editor, he would have found a letter written that day at Fortress Monroe, after I had my interview with Major Carey, and in that letter he would have read the following: They reported that they were about to be sent South, and hence sought protection.
Major Carey came in with a flag of truce and claimed their rendition under the fugitive slave law, and was informed by General Butler that under the peculiar circumstances he considered the fugitives contraband of war, and had set them to work inside the fortress.
Speaking of phrases, they will stick to the man they belong to. This one will stick to me in spite of all efforts to the contrary, and I know of another phrase which will stick to you in spite of all yours, because no Christian gentleman will ever claim it, and no man of good literary taste will ever permit it to be ascribed to him.
I made requisition on General Scott for horses, for artillery, for wagons, and for tents and camp equipage, as my command was largely unprovided for in that regard. At last I sent my brother to Washington to get authority to buy some. He got it, and went to Baltimore and bought one hundred and twenty-five very good horses. Meanwhile I had sent to my home for nine horses of my own, which were coming as soon as they could be got there. Orders were left that the horses obtained by my brother should be sent on after him to Fortress Monroe; but he was not an old campaigner, and did not know that there were as many horse thieves in the army as there were out of it.
The next day, his horses not coming, he went to see what the matter was, and found that one hundred and odd had been taken to Washington, so it was very lucky that mine from home had not got there. This loss of horses for my artillery was of very serious consequence to me and a serious loss to the country.
If I could have had a few horses so that I could have mounted my artillery and picked out a few of my best soldiers Marching contrabands to work at Fortress Monroe. Marching Contrabands to Work at Fortress Monroe. There was a point nine miles from the fort and on the road leading from Hampton to Yorktown, which I learned the rebels intended to entrench and hold, because they expected a move towards Richmond to be made very soon.
The insane cry of On to Richmond had been continually sounded by Mr. Greeley and his coadjutors. After carefully reconnoitring the position, I concluded upon an attack.
A creek crossed the road close by the church known as the Bethel. The bridge over this creek was attempted to be commanded by a slight fortification some half a cannon-shot distance beyond. Hill, of North Carolina, held it with five hundred men. Our negro scouts reported them two thousand in number, and they really thought there were as many as that, for a negro scout had to be a veteran in the war before he learned that two hundred men were not a thousand, and that five hundred were not two thousand.
So upon the point of numbers I was satisfied; and I was further convinced that there were no more than one thousand in Yorktown, that might possibly come to Bethel, as they afterwards did. After the most careful and thorough preparation, and a personal reconnoissance of the lay of the country by Major Winthrop, I came to the conclusion to attempt to take this post, and I drew up with his aid the following order for the detail of the movement: Each will be supported by sufficient reserves under arms in camp, and with advanced guards out on the road of march.
Duryea to push out two picket posts at 10 P. Second picket half as far as the first. Both pickets to keep as much out of sight as possible. No one whatever to be allowed to pass out through their lines. Persons to be allowed to pass inward toward Hampton, unless it appears that they intend to go roundabout and dodge through to the front. At 12, midnight, Colonel Duryea will march his regiment, with fifteen round cartridges, on the county road towards Little Bethel. Scows will be provided to ferry them across Hampton Creek.
March to be rapid, but not hurried. A howitzer with canister and shrapnel to go. A wagon with planks and material to repair the Newmarket bridge. Duryea to have the two hundred rifles. He will pick the men to whom to entrust them. Rocket to be thrown up from Newport News. Notify Commodore Pendergrast of this to prevent general alarm. Newport News movement to be made somewhat later, as the distance is less. If we find the enemy and surprise them, men will fire one volley, if desirable, not reload, and go ahead with the bayonet.
As the attack is to be by night, or dusk of morning, and in two detachments, our people should have some token, say a white rag or dirty white rag on the left arm. Perhaps the detachments who are to do the job should be smaller than a regiment, three hundred or five hundred, as the right and left of the attack would be more easily handled. If we bag the Little Bethel men, push on to Big Bethel, and similarly bag them. Burn both the Bethels, or blow up if brick. To protect our rear in case we take the field-pieces, and the enemy should march his main body if he has any to recover them, it would be well to have a squad of competent artillerists, regular or other, to handle the captured guns on the retirement of our main body.
Also spikes to spike them if retaken. Most of the work will be done with the bayonet, and they are already handy with the old ones. There was a small negro church called Little Bethel which stood in advance of Great Bethel a short distance.
That was in no way fortified, and sheltered a few men. I could not go with the command myself and it was not proper that I should; but I selected as commander my officer next in rank, General Pierce, of Massachusetts. I very much wished to devolve the command on Colonel Phelps as certainly the more competent officer, but there were unfortunately one or two colonels outranking him that were no more qualified than General Pierce, and I did not like to do these officers an apparent injustice.
Besides I did not deem the enterprise at all difficult. Newport News was nearer Bethel, and my proposition was that the regiment there should start later than the two regiments from Camp Hamilton, and that at a well-known junction of the road they should meet, advance as fast as possible, capture Little Bethel, which could easily be done, and then all make an assault at daylight upon the entrenchments at Great Bethel.
To be sure of having the march properly timed, I ordered the signal to be given at Newport News. There were four very small howitzers which were to be drawn by the men, for want of horses to take up larger guns. With six of our men to one of the enemy I could not conceive how there could be any possibility of not marching at once over the works; and if the troops had marched steadily forward the rebels would not have stayed a minute.
Everything was utterly mismanaged. When the troops got out four or five miles to the junction where the regiments were to meet, it being early dawn and the officers being very much scared, Colonel Bendix mistook the colonels and staff of the other regiment for a body of cavalry, and fired upon them. The fire was returned; and by that performance we not only lost more men than were lost in the battle, but also ended all chance for a surprise.
The two regiments marched forward, the main force remaining behind. Duryea took Little Bethel, which had been abandoned.
He was pretty soon left by the Zouaves, who took shelter in the woods. That was no harm, as nobody came out from the entrenchments to disturb him. From that time there did not seem to be a head more than a cabbage head to undertake to do anything, except it might be Winthrop. Greble held his position an hour and a half, while the main body of the troops stood about a half mile from his position waiting for the officers to form a plan of battle.
They carefully disobeyed orders, which were, as has been seen, to go right ahead with fixed bayonets and fire but one shot, and they did not do even that.
If they had only marched steadily forward, as I have said before, the enemy would have fled. The plan that they at last agreed upon was well enough, only an exceedingly contrary one. They decided not to attack the rebel position in front, but to endeavor to go around it. But as Townsend moved up, a portion of his command got a little ahead of him on the other side of a stone wall. When he saw them, he took them for a body of the enemy trying to flank him, and at once concluded to retire.
He did retire, leaving Winthrop near the fort in expectation of instant victory. Winthrop sprang upon a log to take a view of the situation, and see how matters stood. He was supported by one private. All the rest of his support had retired under orders. As he stood up in full view, a rifle shot from the enemy killed him instantly.
A council was called and all the colonels but Duryea voted to retire, and Pierce gave the order. The ground it was put upon was that the troops with long marching were hungry. They had actually marched eleven miles; and if Pierce had given the order for them to sit down and take lunch, the enemy would have run away as is now known they did dobecause they would have supposed we had come to stay.
A few volunteers headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Warren remained on the field until they could pick up all the wounded. Upon the return to the fort the stories that were brought back were sufficient evidence of the great alarm. Pierce said that there were between four and five thousand of the enemy. These statements will perhaps be better summed up in the way they finally got into the Northern press, through a communication addressed to me: When they are commanded to march through fire and reach the ditch, they must be provided with the means to cross it, or jump into it, and sticking their bayonets into the slope of the scarp, form with them ladders by means of which the more active can mount the parapet.
But before men are sent into a position — recollecting that every ditch will be swept by a flank fire — they must not only be instructed in their duties, but supported by a steady fire upon the enemy. As a specimen of the stories reported back, I have a vivid memory of an extraordinary one told me by one of the bravest young men I ever knew.
He was then not even a private in the army, but he begged of me the privilege of going with the expedition and carrying a musket. His father was a warm friend of mine and I took his son in my charge when I first started, using him as a sort of private secretary to take care of my papers and copy some of them. He went down there with me, became a very efficient officer, distinguished for bravery and dash, and in two years was made a brigadier-general for his defence of one of the forts on the Mississippi River against a very superior force of the enemy.
He was a very level-headed gentleman in every particular. I think I left him in the Department of the Gulf as a lieutenant-colonel. There his promotions were got under other commanders.
Yet in the evening of that day at Great Bethel, after I had spent several hours hearing all sorts of stories, he came into my office and said: Well, we took Little Bethel, and that was not anything to take; the rebels had run away. As we came up to the woods the enemy began to fire at us and the balls at first went over our heads into the trees.
I guess if they had been regular balls the men would have stood it, but they broke and scattered to the woods. It seemed as if they might as well scatter as anyway; because there was nobody came out of the fort at us.
There was a ditch in the front, and if we had got up to it it would have been impossible for us to have climbed up so as to get in it. But Winthrop went clear up farther than any of us, and then he. Some reported as many as thirty guns. As a matter of fact, there were three six-pounder field-pieces, and the fortification was so low that they had to dig an excavation to let the wheels down so as to bring the top of the parapet above the top of the gun carriages so as to protect them from our fire.
Afterwards I rode my horse at full trot over those thirteen feet high parapets. Carey at Union picket lines next Hampton. I asked him if he was afraid to go up that night to Big Bethel and see who were there and how many there were. He said he would go up, and I gave him a light basket containing some restoratives and bandages if he should find any wounded. He started with alacrity. I told him to get back as soon as he could, and to have me called at whatever hour of night.
Returning before daybreak he reported to me, and from the nature of the report, I had no doubt of its truth. He had gone on to the field, and had looked around in the woods to see if he could find any wounded or dead men, but found none. He crept up carefully near the works and listened to hear any noise of a sentinel or anybody. Not hearing anything, he cautiously advanced until he got up to the breastwork, and then, after carefully looking it over, he went into the work, and found not one soul there.
The enemy had retired, and nobody to this day, as far as I can ascertain, knows whether the rebels went before our men did or afterwards. Carey at Union Pickett Lines next Hampton. It may be worthy of note that the same thing happened at the battle near Manassas Junction, known as the battle of Bull Run; after the fight both armies ran away, so that there was no armed force on the battle field, as I have been informed, and correctly, I believe.
It will be seen that the affair at Bethel was simply a skirmish, and not even a respectable one at that, either in the vigor of the attack or in the loss of men. When the plan of the expedition became fully known and the condition of the place which was to be attacked was ascertained, nobody criticised the movement, as there were two regiments to go into the fight with a brigadier-general in command. I had but one brigadier-general, General Pierce, and I had to give him the command.
Yet while no blame could seem to attach to me, a senseless cry went out against me, and it almost cost me my confirmation in the Senate. Of course every Democrat voted against me, and so did some of the Republicans, for various reasons. I suppose I should have failed of confirmation if Colonel Baker, then senator from Oregon, who had been detailed to do duty with me at Fortress Monroe, had not been in his seat and explained the senselessness of the clamor.
But one senator from my own State voted for me, the other, the senior senator, voting against me because of my difference with Governor Andrew on the slave question. In the meantime neither horses nor artillery came. I did, however, get a very valuable reinforcement of a California regiment and a half, at the head of which was Colonel Baker, who had had some experience in Mexico as an officer. We agreed to attempt, as soon as our horses and artillery should come, an expedition that would reflect credit on both of us, and we determined that neither should blame the other if it failed, because both would go together.
I asked, on the 23d of May, for a few artillery and cavalry horses with their equipments.
These were not received from Washington until July 21, and then only after every possible exertion on my part even to the extent, as we have seen, of causing them to be bought by my own agent and having them brought on to Washington. This was not negligence, as I at first supposed, but studied unjust treatment. I should not venture to say this did I not have it in a letter from a man in Washington who knew everything that was done about army headquarters, — a bold soldier, an officer, a general.
As he is yet alive I do not give his name; but the letter has been published now more than a quarter of a century and no man has ever dared to question it. It is as follows: I have told him that ——— would never let you have any troops to make any great blow, and I read the despatch to show that I understood my man. He intended to treat you as he did ———and as he has always treated those whom he knew would be effective if he gave them the means, retaining everything in his own power and under his own immediate control, so as to monopolize all the reputation to be made.
I have been a little afraid lest you might attempt more than your means justified, under the impression that you would otherwise disappoint, the country. But I am pleased to see that you have not made this mistake. You will gradually get the means, and then you may make an effective blow.
Unfortunately, indeed, the difficulties increase as your force increases, if not more rapidly. We have forty thousand men, I believe, and provisions and transportation enough to take them to Richmond any day, and yet our lines do not extend five miles into Virginia, where there are not, in my opinion, men enough to oppose the march of half the number to Richmond. This war will last forever if something does not happen to unseat old ———. Congress will probably catch us without our having performed any service worthy of the great force we have under pay.
I grumble this way all the time, and to everybody, in the hope that I may contribute to push on the column. I am very much in hopes we shall be pushed into action by the indignation of the people, if not by our own sense of what is due to the cause we have taken in hand.
On the day that I received my horses and artillery and was preparing to start on our expedition, the battle of Bull Run was fought.
I had ascertained before, from a private source, that I was not to have any aid before the battle of Bull Run, and that some of my troops were to be withdrawn. Immediately after that battle, which was predestined to disaster on our side, as I shall take leave to make plain hereafter, an order came on the 24th of July that all my effective forces should be removed to Baltimore together with Colonel Baker.
They had become so frightened at Washington that they supposed the secessionists of Baltimore would rise, while there was no more danger of it than there was of an outbreak at Boston. In fact, there never was at any time during the war so much of an outbreak at Baltimore as there was at Boston when the draft riots occurred; and that Boston outbreak was put down by a young officer of mine, Lieutenant Carruth, with two pieces of artillery, served by men who had not yet been mustered into service.
Of course this move of Scott ended all hope or expectation that anything further would be allowed to be done at Fortress Monroe. To make it sure that nothing more would be done, as Scott thought, he soon afterward sent a man to relieve me from command that could not do anything but simply occupy the position of commander of that department, and leave me to do the work, and restrain me from doing anything.
Scott, Assistant Secretary of War: I pray you get this thing through for me, and I will be obliged forever and ever. I am losing good daylight, now that the three months men are being disbanded.
Can you not add this to the many kind courtesies of our friendship? Truly yours, Headquarters of the Army, August 8, It is desirable that you repair to and assume command of the department of which Fortress Monroe is the place of headquarters.
In fact, however, Cromwell, fighting alongside the parliamentary general Sir Thomas Fairfaxsucceeded in stemming the Royalist attacks at Winceby in Lincolnshire and then successfully besieged Newark in Nottinghamshire.
The 54th Massachusetts Infantry
He was now able to persuade the House of Commons, well pleased with these victories, to create a new army, that would not merely defend eastern England but would march out and attack the enemy. Gwendraith This new army was formed under the command of Edward Montagu, 2nd earl of Manchesterearly in After an alliance had been concluded with the Scots, he was also appointed a member of the Committee of Both Kingdoms, which became responsible for the overall strategy of the Civil War. But since he was engaged at the front during the campaigning season, Cromwell took little part in its deliberations.
He was, however, defeated in the Battle of Marston MoorJuly 2,that in effect gave the north of England to Parliament. He did not believe that Manchester really wanted to win the war, and in mid-September he laid his complaints before the Committee of Both Kingdoms. Oliver Cromwell at the Battle of Marston Moor. Manchester retorted by attacking Cromwell in the House of Lords.
In DecemberCromwell proposed that in the future no members of either house of Parliament should be allowed to hold commands or offices in the armed forces; his proposal was accepted, and it was also agreed that a new army should be constituted under Sir Thomas Fairfax. Cromwell, an admirer of Fairfax, put forward his name and then busied himself with planning the new army, from which, as a member of Parliament, he himself was excluded. But, significantly, the post of second in command was left open, and, when the Civil War reached its climax in the summer ofFairfax insisted that Cromwell should be appointed to it.
Thus he was able to join Fairfax in the siege of Oxford, from which Charles I escaped before it surrendered. He attributed these victories to the mercy of God and demanded that the men who had served the country so faithfully should have their due reward. The army was growing more and more restive, and, on the day Cromwell left London, a party of soldiers seized Charles I. Cromwell and his son-in-law, Henry Iretoninterviewed the king twice, trying to persuade him to agree to a constitutional settlement that they then intended to submit to Parliament.
At that time Cromwell, no enemy of the king, was touched by his devotion to his children. His main task, however, was to overcome the general feeling in the army that neither the king nor Parliament could be trusted. When, under pressure from the rank and file, General Fairfax led the army toward the houses of Parliament in London, Cromwell still insisted that the authority of Parliament must be upheld, and in September he also resisted a proposal in the House of Commons that no further addresses should be made to the king.
Just over a month later he took the chair at meetings of the General Council of the Army which included representatives of the private soldiers known as Agitators [Adjutators] and assured them that he was not committed to any particular form of government and had not had any underhand dealings with the king.
On the other hand, fearing anarchyhe opposed extremist measures such as the abolition of the monarchy and the House of Lords and the introduction of a more democratic constitution. General Fairfax first ordered Cromwell into Wales to crush a rising there and then sent him north to fight the Scottish army that invaded England in June.
Though his army was inferior in numbers to that of the Scots and northern Royalists, he defeated them both in a campaign in Lancashire ; then he entered Scotland and restored order there; finally he returned to Yorkshire and took charge of the siege of Pontefract. The correspondence he conducted during the siege with the governor of the Isle of Wight, whose duty it was to keep watch on the king, reveals that he was increasingly turning against Charles.
Parliamentary commissioners had been sent to the island in order to make one final effort to reach an agreement with the king. But Cromwell told the governor that the king was not to be trusted, that concessions over religion must not be granted, and that the army might be considered a lawful power capable of ensuring the safety of the people and the liberty of all Christians.
Great Souls at Prayer
While Cromwell, still not entirely decided on his course, lingered in the north, his son-in-law Ireton and other officers in the southern army took decisive action. They drew up a remonstrance to Parliament complaining about the negotiations in the Isle of Wight and demanding the trial of the king as a Man of Blood.
While Cromwell still felt uncertain about his own views, he admitted that his army agreed with the army in the south. Fairfax now ordered him to return to London, but he did not arrive until after Ireton and his colleagues had removed from the House of Commons all members who favoured continuing negotiations with the king.
He was one of the commissioners in the High Court of Justice and, when the king refused to plead, he signed the death warrant. Detesting the Irish as primitive, savage, and superstitious, he believed they had carried out a huge massacre of English settlers in Fairfax had refused the command, so on June 25 Cromwell was appointed captain general in his place.
He felt more tender toward the Scots, most of whom were fellow Puritans, than toward the Catholic Irish. The campaign proved difficult, and during the winter of Cromwell was taken ill. But he defeated the Scots with an army inferior in numbers at the Battle of Dunbar on September 3,and a year later, when Charles II and the Scots advanced into England, Cromwell destroyed that army at Worcester.
This battle ended the Civil Wars. Cromwell now hoped for pacification, a political settlement, and social reform. It believed that the members were corrupt and that a new Parliament should be called. Once again Cromwell tried to mediate between the two antagonistsbut his sympathies were with his soldiers. When he finally came to the conclusion that Parliament must be dissolved and replaced, he called in his musketeers and on April 20,expelled the members from the House.
But just as he had considered the previous Parliament to be slow and self-seeking, he came to think that the Assembly of Saints, as it was called, was too hasty and too radical. He also resented the fact that it did not consult him.
As commander in chief appointed by Parliament, he believed that he was the only legally constituted authority left. Administration as lord protector Before Cromwell summoned his first Protectorate Parliament on September 3,he and his Council of State passed more than 80 ordinances embodying a constructive domestic policy.
His aim was to reform the law, to set up a Puritan Church, to permit toleration outside it, to promote education, and to decentralize administration. The resistance of the lawyers somewhat dampened his enthusiasm for law reform, but he was able to appoint good judges both in England and Ireland.
He was strongly opposed to severe punishments for minor crimessaying: During his Protectorate, committees known as Triers and Ejectors were set up to ensure that a high standard of conduct was maintained by clergy and schoolmasters. In spite of resistance from some members of his council Cromwell readmitted Jews into the country.
He concerned himself with educationwas an excellent chancellor of Oxford Universityfounded a college at Durhamand saw to it that grammar schools flourished as they had never done before. Foreign and economic policies In Cromwell brought about a satisfactory conclusion to the Anglo-Dutch Warwhich, as a contest between fellow Protestants, he had always disliked.
The question then arose of how best to employ his army and navy. His Council of State was divided, but eventually he resolved to conclude an alliance with France against Spain. As the price for sending an expeditionary force to Spanish Flanders to fight alongside the French he obtained possession of the port of Dunkirk. He also interested himself in Scandinavian affairs; although he admired King Charles X of Swedenhis first consideration in attempting to mediate in the Baltic was the advantages that would result for his own country.
In spite of the emphasis Cromwell laid on the Protestant interest in some of his speechesthe guiding motive in his foreign policy was national and not religious benefit. His economic and industrial policy followed mainly traditional lines. But he opposed monopolieswhich were disliked by the country and had only benefited the court gentry under Queen Elizabeth and the first two Stuarts.
For this reason the East Indian trade was thrown open for three years, but in the end Cromwell granted the company a new charter October in return for financial aid. A radical in some directions, such as in seeking the reform of the laws, Cromwell now adopted a conservative attitude because he feared that the overthrow of the monarchy might lead to political collapse. Except for convinced republicans, the members agreed to do so but were still more concerned with rewriting the constitution than reforming the laws as desired by the protector.
As soon as he could legitimately do so January 22,Cromwell dissolved Parliament. In the aftermath of that Parliament, Cromwell faced a Royalist insurrection. The rising fizzled out—too many of those who had secretly pledged support to the king waited to see what others were doing—but Cromwell was aware that local magistrates and militia commissioners had closely monitored the situation. He could rely on the acquiescence of the gentry but not on any commitment from them.
He therefore determined to increase security by sending senior army officers the major generals to recruit veterans of the Civil Wars into an efficient militiathe costs of which would be defrayed by collections from all those convicted of royalism in thes.